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There has been considerable criticism of the use of human dignity as a guiding value in
the context of South Africa's equality jurisprudence. What are the implications of the
use of the value in socio-economic rights jurisprudence? Drawing on the work of
Martha Nussbaum, the article links the value of human dignity to the material
conditions necessary to enable people to develop and exercise their capabilities. Access
to basic social services is crucial not only to people's physical survival, but also to
enable the development of their potential to shape their own lives and to be active
agents in the shaping of our new society. Human dignity as a relational concept
requires society to respect the equal worth of the poor by marshalling its resources to
redress the conditions that perpetuate their marginalisation. This, in turn, requires a
focus on the actual impact of the state's actions or omissions on the life chances of
disadvantaged groups, and a response that is proportionate to the seriousness of that
impact. In constitutional adjudication, it requires that a high burden of justification is
placed on the state in cases involving a deprivation of basic human needs. The article
concludes by examining how the Constitutional Court's reasonableness review
standard and remedial jurisprudence could be strengthened to accord greater value
to this conception of human dignity.
I INTRODUCTION
Without the ability to secure the immediate needs of the present, the future is little more
than a far-off possibility, remote both in perception and in reality.1
The inclusion of socio-economic rights as justiciable rights in the South
African Bill of Rights affirms the critical importance of material
conditions to human survival and development.2 In their seminal article,
* HF Oppenheimer Chair in Human Rights Law, University of Stellenbosch. Earlier versions of
this paper were read at the SAJHR conference `Twenty Years of Human Rights Scholarship
and Ten Years of Democracy' (5±7 July 2004), and at the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced
Study (STIAS) seminar on `Theories of Social and Economic Justice' (30±31 July 2004).
Participants at both these events provided valuable comments and suggestions, for which I am
indebted. I am also grateful for the comments and insights of my colleagues, AndreÂ van der
Walt and Lourens du Plessis, as well as the suggestions received from the SAJHR editors.
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1 Arbour J in Gosselin v QueÂbec (Attorney General) 2002 SCC 84, 392.
2 The Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (1996
Constitution') proclaims that the Constitution was adopted with the purpose (amongst others)
to `[i]mprove the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person'.
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arguing for the constitutional protection of socio-economic rights in
South Africa, Craig Scott and Patrick Maklem argued as follows:
Perhaps the strongest reason for including a certain number of economic and social rights
is that by constitutionalising half of the human rights equation, South Africans would be
constitutionalising only part of what it is to be a full person. A constitution containing
only civil and political rights projects an image of truncated humanity. Symbolically, but
still brutally it excludes those segments of society for whom autonomy means little
without the necessities of life.3
Socio-economic rights are not valued as commodities, but because of
what they enable human beings to do and to be.4 If basic subsistence
needs are not met, humans face severe threats to life and health. But, in
addition, such deprivation impedes the development of a whole range of
human capabilities, including the ability to fulfil life plans and participate
effectively in political, economic and social life.5 It also deprives society
3 C Scott & P Macklem `Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights
in a New South African Constitution' (1992) 141 Univ of Pennsylvania LR 1, 29.
4 Martha Nussbaum has provided an influential philosophical justification for constitutional
principles aimed at ensuring the conditions for the development and exercise of human
capabilities. See particularly MC NussbaumWomen and Human Development ± The Capabilities
Approach (2000) (hereafter `Women and Human Development'). Her approach focuses `on
human capabilities, that is, what people are actually able to do and to be ± in a way informed by
an intuitive idea of a life that is worthy of the dignity of the human being'. (5) On the
relationship between capabilities and human rights, seeWomen and Human Development 96-101
and Nussbaum `Capabilities, Human Rights and the Universal Declaration' in BH Weston &
SP Marks (eds) The Future of International Human Rights (1999) 25-64. In development
economics, the capabilities approach to quality of life assessments was pioneered by Amartya
Sen in a range of works, including his collaboration of the Human Development Reports of the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). See, for example, `Equality of What' in A
Sen Choice, Welfare and Measurement (1982) 353-369 and his recent work, Development as
Freedom (2001). For Sen, the goal of development should be to expand the capabilities of
persons `to lead the kind of lives they value ± and have reason to value' (Development as
Freedom 18). Nussbaum discusses the differences between her and Sen's `capabilities' theory in
Women and Human Development 11-15. However, both view the `capabilities' approach as more
appropriate to quality of life assessments in human development than many of the traditional
alternatives. Nussbaum discusses the defects of standard approaches such as Gross National
Product (GNP) per capita, utilitarian approaches (which ask about the total or average utility
of the population, as measured by expressions of satisfaction), and approaches focusing on
basic resource distribution in Women and Human Development 59-70.
5 For an account of the impact and experience of poverty in South Africa, see J May Poverty and
Inequality in South Africa: Report Prepared for the Office of the Executive Deputy President and
the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality (PIR Report) (1998). See particularly
the experiences of poverty documented by The South African Participatory Poverty
Assessment: `The Experience and Perceptions of Poverty' Data Research Africa Report (SA-
PPA) cited on 3-5 of the PIR Report. These include: alienation from the community, emotional
stress and anxiety, food insecurity, the impact of time-consuming domestic tasks, particularly
for poor women, overcrowded living conditions with the associated loss of privacy, and an
increased exposure to violence. The impact on people's life chances of a lack of access to basic
services and productive resources such as land is vividly illustrated in the Report of the
National `Speak Out on Poverty' Hearings convened by the Commission for Gender Equality,
the South African Human Rights Commission and the South African NGO Coalition from
March to June 1998: see D Budlender The People's Voices (1998).
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of the contributions of all its members.6 Thus both the individual and
society are impoverished by our collective failure to ensure living
conditions worthy of the dignity of people as both individual and social
beings.7
As justiciable rights, socio-economic rights must be interpreted in the
context of concrete cases. The courts must determine how much must be
provided, to whom, at what pace and in what order of priority. In order
to do so, they must explicate the underlying values that guide the
interpretation of these rights. In so doing, the courts also affirm the
values constituting our post-apartheid society.8
Human dignity as a right and value has played a central role in the
Constitutional Court's human rights jurisprudence.9 The Court has also
invoked dignity as the central value informing its approach to the
interpretation of socio-economic rights, particularly the reasonableness
standard of review for the positive duties imposed by these rights.10 Thus
Yacoob J stated in Grootboom:
It is fundamental to an evaluation of the reasonableness of state action that account be
taken of the inherent dignity of human beings. The Constitution will be worth infinitely
less than its paper if the reasonableness of state action concerned with housing is
determined without regard to the fundamental constitutional value of human dignity.
Section 26, read in the context of the Bill of Rights as a whole, must mean that the
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6 Sen expresses this reciprocal relationship as follows: `These capabilities can be enhanced by
public policy, but also, on the other side, the direction of public policy can be influenced by the
effective use of participatory capabilities by the public.' Development as Freedom (note 4 above)
18.
7 Jennifer Nedelsky describes human beings `as both essentially individual and essentially social
creatures'. `Reconceiving Rights as Relationship' (1993) 1 Review of Constitutional Studies 1, 8. In
National Coalition forGay&Lesbian Equality vMinister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) Sachs J refers
to the constitutional recognition of the associational dimensions of human life as follows: `While
recognising the unique worth of each person, the Constitution does not presuppose that a holder of
rights is an isolated, lonely and abstract figure possessing a disembodied and socially disconnected
self. It acknowledges that people live in their bodies, their communities, their cultures, their places
and their times.' (para 117). See also Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) para 67.
8 In Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) para 35 O'Regan J described the
role of the constitutional value of human dignity in constituting post-apartheid society: `The
Constitution asserts dignity to contradict our past in which human dignity for black South
Africans was routinely and cruelly denied. It asserts it too to inform the future, to invest in our
democracy respect for the intrinsic worth of all human beings.'
9 In Dawood (ibid) para 35 the Constitutional Court held that the value of human dignity `is a
value that informs the interpretation of many, possibly all, other rights'. See, for example,
S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 144 (Chaskalson P) and para 328 (O'Regan J)
(death penalty); August v Electoral Commission 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) para 16 (Sachs J) (right to
vote); and the range of equality cases in which dignity is a central factor in identifying `unfair'
discrimination: for example Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) paras 50-51; National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice (note 7 above) paras 15-28
(Ackermann J) and paras 120-129 (Sachs J).
10 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) paras 38, 41.
respondents have a right to reasonable action by the state in all circumstances and with
particular regard to human dignity. In short, I emphasise that human beings are required
to be treated as human beings.11
This article explores the value of human dignity in interpreting socio-
economic rights.12 My focus is primarily on the positive duties imposed on
these rights to facilitate and provide access to social benefits.13 I examine
the critiques of human dignity as a guiding value in the context of South
Africa's equality jurisprudence. In response to these critiques I explore
traditions in the interpretation of human dignity that can make a positive
contribution to our evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights.
By focusing on human dignity, I am not claiming that dignity is the
only value that explicates our commitment to socio-economic rights.14
There is an important body of literature that explores the significance of a
number of other values in relation to socio-economic rights.15 The core
11 Ibid para 83. On the relationship between human dignity as an independent right, the other
rights specifically entrenched in the Bill of Rights and the value of human dignity, see Dawood
(note 8 above) para 35.
12 On the relationship between human dignity as an independent right, the other rights
specifically entrenched in the Bill of Rights, and the value of human dignity, see Dawood (note
8 above) para 35; Jaftha v Schoeman 2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC) para 21.
13 Section 7(2) of the Constitution places an overarching duty on the State `to respect, protect,
promote and fulfil' the rights in the Bill of Rights. This signals that the rights in the Bill of
Rights impose a combination of negative and positive duties. For a discussion of these duties
in the context of socio-economic rights, see S Liebenberg `The Interpretation of Socio-
Economic Rights' in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2004) 33-6
± 33-7; See also The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and
Social Rights v Nigeria Communication No 155/96 October 2001, African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights paras 44 ± 47 (available at <http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/
humanrts/africa/comcases/155-96.html>).
14 The Constitutional Court has affirmed that all three foundational constitutional values are
implicated in a denial of socio-economic rights: `All the rights in our Bill of Rights are inter-
related and mutually supporting. There can be no doubt that human dignity, freedom and
equality, the foundational values of our society, are denied those who have no food, clothing
or shelter. Affording socio-economic rights to all people therefore enables them to enjoy the
other rights enshrined in Chapter 2. The realisation of these rights is also key to the
advancement of race and gender equality and the evolution of a society in which men and
women are equally able to achieve their full potential.' Grootboom (note 10 above) para 23. See
also Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwa-Zulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) para 8.
15 See, for example, N Haysom `Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-
Economic Rights' (1992) 2 SAJHR 451 (a basic floor of socio-economic rights is required to
guarantee a minimum degree of civic and political participation); For a similar argument in the
US context, see: FI Michelman `Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy' (1979) 3
Washington Univ LQ 659 (socio-economic rights are necessary prerequisites of effective
participation in representative democracy); P de Vos `Grootboom, The Right of Access to
Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness' (2001) 17 SAJHR 258 (the right to
equality and socio-economic rights are `two sides of the same coin' in that they seek to achieve
`. . .a specific contextual form of equality as the realisation of particular social and economic
rights', 263, 265). For a discussion of the shortcomings and theoretical limitations of an
equality-based theoretical justification of socio-economic rights, see A van der Walt `A South
African Reading of Frank Michelman's Theory of Social Justice' in H Botha et al (eds) Rights
and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2004) 163, 174-9. Nonetheless, as this paper
illustrates, there are important insights in equality jurisprudence regarding the application of
human dignity to adjudicate the constitutionality of people's exclusion from social benefits.
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foundational values of human dignity, freedom and equality are in any
event highly interrelated.16 I focus on human dignity because of the
important role it has played in the Constitutional Court's human rights
jurisprudence in general, and because its role in the interpretation of
socio-economic rights has been relatively unexplored. I also seek to
develop a concept of human dignity that can help identify deficiencies in
the Court's current socio-economic rights jurisprudence and illuminate
how the jurisprudence should be developed to constitute a stronger
response to socio-economic deprivation.
II CRITIQUES OF DIGNITY AS A VALUE IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
There have been several critiques of human dignity as a guiding value in
constitutional adjudication, particularly in relation to equality jurispru-
dence and the test for unfair discrimination.17 However, these critiques
are also relevant to human dignity as a guiding value in socio-economic
rights jurisprudence and for this reason they require careful consideration
here.
Three major critiques of dignity as a value in human rights
adjudication have been articulated. The first relates to the alleged
indeterminacy of human dignity as a normative concept. Thus it has been
argued that dignity is too vague and multifaceted a concept to serve us
well as a guiding value in equality jurisprudence.18 The second critique
asserts that human dignity as a value is irrevocably linked with the
protection of freedom and autonomy. As such, it serves to discourage the
positive, redistributive measures needed to remedy conditions such as
material inequality and disadvantage.19 Cathi Albertyn and Beth
Goldblatt have most forcefully articulated a third critique (which is
closely related to the second) in the context of equality jurisprudence.
They argue that the reliance on the value of dignity in the test for unfair
discrimination promotes a narrow focus on individual personality issues
as opposed to `a group-based understanding of material advantage and
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16 Kriegler J refers to human dignity, equality and freedom as `conjoined, reciprocal and covalent
values' which are `foundational' to South Africa: S v Mamabolo 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) para 41.
17 The Constitutional Court's approach to s 9 of the Constitution is set out in Harksen (note 9
above) paras 50-53. Dignity plays an important role in both the identification of unlisted
prohibited grounds of discrimination and the factors for determining whether the
discrimination is unfair: Harksen paras 49 and 51.
18 For example, Davis alludes to the `multifaceted meanings' of dignity, and argues that the
Court `has given dignity both a content and scope that make for a piece of jurisprudential
Legoland ± to be used in whatever form and shape is required by the demands of the judicial
designer'. D Davis `Equality: The Majesty of Legoland Jurisprudence' (1999) 116 SALJ 398,
413. See also D Davis Democracy and Deliberation (1999) 69-95.
19 This critique is discussed by Susie Cowen in her article defending the use of the value of human
dignity in South African's equality jurisprudence: `Can ``Dignity'' Guide South Africa's
Equality Jurisprudence' (2001) 17 SAJHR 34, 51-8.
disadvantage'.20 It could result in `an individualised and abstract
conception of equality divorced from actual social and economic
disadvantage.'21 Thus the need to redress systemic patterns of inequality
and disadvantage are obscured by focusing on individual personality
issues related to subjective feelings of self-respect and self-worth.
If dignity as a value is inextricably aligned with negative liberty and
individual personality issues, it will be inimical to the development of a
transformative socio-economic rights jurisprudence. In the next section I
will develop an argument that there are positive traditions associated
with the interpretation of human dignity that can add value to our socio-
economic rights jurisprudence. In so doing, I am not seeking to deny the
dangers of a regressive deployment of human dignity in the interpretation
of rights such as equality, and indeed, socio-economic rights. Certainly, I
believe that there is a case to be made that the Constitutional Court has
not engaged sufficiently with the value of equality in its s 9 jurispru-
dence.22 My concern is to examine how the value of human dignity can
enrich, rather than impoverish, our evolving jurisprudence on socio-
economic rights.
III HUMAN DIGNITY AS A VALUE
Dignity has deep roots in Kantian moral philosophy that affirms the
inherent worth of human beings. According to the Kantian imperative
human beings should be treated `never simply as a means, but always at
the same time as an end'.23 In other words, we should relate to each other
as having intrinsic worth as human beings. O'Regan J affirms this notion
of human dignity as follows:
20 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt `Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality' (1998) 14 SAJHR 248, 257-258,
272. Similar arguments in support of the development of a more substantive approach to
equality were made by the Centre for Applied Legal Studies in their amicus intervention in
National Coalition (note 7 above): see paras 58-64 (Ackermann J) and paras 120-129 (Sachs J).
21 C Albertyn `Equality' in M H Cheadle et al (eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of
Rights (2002) 51, 60.
22 Albertyn (ibid ) attributes this reluctance, at least partially, to the Court's discomfort with the
notion that `the value of equality encompasses an idea of material equality and economic
redistribution.' She argues that this `redistributive function sits uncomfortably with the
institutional role of courts and with the distinction the courts seek to draw between issues of
social policy and issues of law' (64-5); See also D Davis `Legoland Jurisprudence' (note 18
above) 413-414. For a recent consideration by the Constitutional Court of the value of
equality in the context of s 9 and the positive duties it imposes on the state, see Minister of
Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) paras 22-27.
23 I Kant The Moral Law: Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1963) (trans H J
Patron) 96, cited and discussed in D Meyerson Rights Limited (1997) 12-13. See also the
discussion of the Kantian imperative and concept of human dignity by L Ackermann `Equality
and the South African Constitution: The Role of Dignity' (2000) 60 Heidelberg Journal of Int
L 537, 540-2.
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The importance of dignity as a founding value of our new Constitution cannot be over-
emphasised. Recognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgment of the intrinsic worth of
human beings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern.24
Human dignity is closely related to the notion of human beings as
agents capable of making moral choices, of shaping our identity, resisting
injustice and participating in the shaping of society.25 Martha Nussbaum
expresses this notion thus:
The core idea is that of the human being as a dignified free being who shapes his or her
own life in cooperation and reciprocity with others, rather than being passively shaped or
pushed around by the world in the manner of a `flock' or `herd' animal. A life that is
really human is one that is shaped throughout by these human powers of practical reason
and sociability.26
Thus, to value the inherent dignity of human beings as a society is to
ensure that people enjoy civil and political liberties and also have effective
access to the social and economic means indispensable to the develop-
ment of their physical, emotional, creative and associational capabilities.
Nussbaum develops a provisional list of `central human capabilities' that
should be secured in political and constitutional principles as a basic
social minimum for all. Through this list she seeks to isolate `those
human capabilities that can be convincingly argued to be of central
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24 Makwanyane (note 9 above) para 328 (emphasis added). See also the comments of
Ackermann J in National Coalition (note 7 above): `Dignity is a difficult concept to capture
in precise terms. At its least, it is clear that the constitutional protection of dignity requires us
to acknowledge the value and worth of all individuals as members of society.' (para 29).
25 In the context of evictions, the Constitutional Court has recently highlighted the importance of
mediation and serious consideration of the need of occupiers for suitable alternative land in
considering whether an eviction is `just and equitable' in terms of the Prevention of Illegal
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE). Sachs J referred to the
importance of mutual respect for people's agency in the following terms: `Thus those seeking
eviction should not be encouraged to rely on concepts of faceless and anonymous squatters
automatically to be expelled as obnoxious social nuisances. Such a stereotypical approach has
no place in the society envisaged by the Constitution; justice and equity require that everyone
is to be treated as an individual bearer of rights entitled to respect for his or her dignity. At the
same time those who find themselves compelled by poverty and landlessness to live in shacks
on the land of others, should be discouraged from regarding themselves as helpless victims,
lacking the possibility of personal moral agency.' Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various
Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 41.
26 Women and Human Development (note 3 above) 72 (footnotes omitted). Nussbaum's notion of
`a life that is really human' has been criticised on the basis that an attempt to elaborate the
conditions of a fully human life implies that those who are denied these conditions, have lost
their dignity, and are no longer `dignified': see D Cornell `A Call for a Nuanced Constitutional
Jurisprudence: Ubuntu, Dignity and Reconciliation' paper presented at a New Social Forms
Seminar organised by the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Stellenbosch
University, 23 July 2004 (available at <www.sun.ac.za/sociology/activities_nsf.htm>). My
own reading of Nussbaum is that she does not claim that poverty deprives people of their
dignity, but rather that society fails to respect the dignity of people by neglecting to create the
conditions under which people's capabilities can develop and be effectively exercised. As she
puts it: `We begin, then, with a sense of the worth and dignity of basic human powers, thinking
of them as claims to a chance for functioning, claims that give rise to correlated social and
political duties.'Women and Human Development (note 4 above) 84. See further the discussion
at 84-86.
importance in any human life, whatever else the person pursues or
chooses'.27 She argues that that they have a `special claim to be supported
for political purposes in a pluralistic society' because of their importance
in making any choice of a way of life possible.'28 Nussbaum's project of
developing a list of `central human capabilities' has been criticised for
being reductive and insufficiently sensitive to human difference, complex-
ity and freedom.29 A valuable feature of the list is its holistic portrayal of
human life. It illustrates that access to socio-economic rights is not simply
a matter of bare survival, but also includes the development and exercise
of the people's associational, intellectual and emotional capabilities. In
any event, I do not believe that it is necessary to subscribe to her list (or
even her project of compiling a list) to support the central idea that we
show respect for human potential and agency by creating an environment
of basic liberties and material support which enables them to flourish.30
In his analysis of human dignity as a normative concept, Oscar
Schachter distinguishes between `the subjective aspect of human dignity
(how one feels or thinks about another) and the objective aspect (how one
treats another)'.31 In its objective, social dimension, he argues that
human dignity `requires recognition of a minimal concept of distributive
justice that would require satisfaction of the essential needs of
everyone'.32 Thus he includes in his list of conduct and ideas that offend
or denigrate the worth and dignity of individuals, `[d]egrading living
27 Women and Human Development (note 4 above) 74. Nussbaum's list of central human
functional capabilities relates to the following dimensions of human existence: life; health;
bodily integrity; the senses, imagination and thought; emotions, practical reason, affiliation;
other species; play; political and material control over one's environment (77-80).
28 Women and Human Development (note 4 above) 75.
29 See K Van Marle ` ``The Capabilities Approach'', ``The Imaginary Domain'', and
``Asymmetrical Reciprocity'' ': Feminist Perspectives on Equality and Justice' (2003) 11
Feminist Legal Studies 255-78, particularly the discussion at 272-3. Sen's reservations about
the search for a list of central human capabilities relates to the difficulty `in seeing how the
exact lists and weights would be chosen without appropriate specification of the context of
their use (which could vary), but also from a disinclination to accept any substantive
diminution of the domain of public reasoning'. For Sen the framework of human capabilities
is important for clarifying and illuminating `the subject matter of public reasoning . . . It does
not ± and cannot ± displace the need for public reasoning.' A Sen `Elements of a Theory of
Human Rights' (2004) 32 Philosophy & Public Affairs 315-356.
30 Nussbaum herself emphasises that the list `remains open-ended and humble; it can always be
contested and remade'. It aims at `multiple realisability', leaving room for more concrete
specification according to local beliefs and circumstances. Women and Human Development
(note 4 above) 77.
31 O Schachter `Human Dignity as a Normative Concept' (1983) 77 Am J of Int Law 848, 849.
32 Ibid 851. David Feldman makes the following observations in relation to the subjective and
objective dimensions of human dignity: `In relation to the subjective aspect of dignity, the law
of human rights will typically be concerned to prevent treatment which damages a person's
self-respect and physical or moral integrity. With regard to the objective aspect, the law will
usually have to go further, imposing positive duties on people to act in ways which optimise
the conditions for social respect and dignity: `Human Dignity as a Value ± Part I' (1999)
Winter Public Law 682, 686-7.
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conditions and deprivation of basic needs'.33 International human rights
law derives both civil and political rights as well as social, economic and
cultural rights from the value of human dignity.34 The Constitutional
Court has also referred on a number of occasions to the disjuncture
between our founding constitutional values and conditions of material
deprivation.35
These approaches to human dignity illustrate that its ambit is by no
means confined to subjective personality issues. On the contrary, respect
for human dignity requires that we pay close attention to conditions of
material disadvantage and its impact on different groups in our society.
This brings us to the concern that human dignity is irrevocably
connected with negative liberty. Accordingly, dignity as a value would
support constraints on state interference with individual liberties, and
would discourage intervention to redistribute social resources. Human
dignity undeniably requires respect for personal autonomy and choices.36
But at the same time our commitment to respect for each person's
substantive freedom and life choices requires the creation of the social
conditions on which people's capacity for personal fulfilment and agency
depend. This leads David Feldman to describe dignity as a `two-edged
sword', which can operate both to uphold and restrict personal liberties:
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33 Schachter (note 31 above) 852.
34 The preambles of both the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(1966) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) recognise that the
rights contained in the respective Covenants `derive from the inherent dignity of the human
person'. In Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social
Rights v Nigeria (note 13 above) the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
derived a right to food from a number of other provisions in the African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights. In particular, it held that the right to food `is inseparably linked to the
dignity of human beings and is therefore essential for the enjoyment and fulfilment of other
rights as health, education, work and political participation'. (para 65).
35 In Soobramoney (note 14 above) paras 8-10 the Constitutional Court affirmed that the
Constitution commits us to transform the intolerable conditions in which people live in order to
vindicate the values of human dignity, equality and freedom. InGrootboom (note 10 above) para 2
the Court stated that the issues in the case remind us of the intolerable conditions under which
many of our people are still living and brings home `the harsh reality that the Constitution's
promise of dignity and equality for all remains a distant dream'. See also A Chaskalson `Human
Dignity as a Foundational Value of our Constitutional Order' (2000) 16 SAJHR 193, 204 ± 205.
36 The links between dignity and freedom are described in the following terms by Ackermann J in
Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC): `Human dignity cannot be fully valued or respected
unless individuals are able to develop their humanity, their ``humanness'' to the full extent of
its potential. Each human being is uniquely talented. Part of the dignity of every human being
is the fact and awareness of this uniqueness. An individual's human dignity cannot be fully
respected or valued unless the individual is permitted to develop his or her talents optimally.
Human dignity has little value without freedom; for without freedom personal development
and fulfilment are not possible. Without freedom, human dignity is little more than an
abstraction. Freedom and dignity are inseparably linked. To deny people their freedom is to
deny them their dignity' (para 49). See also Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 (2) SA
794 (CC): `Our society is diverse. . .The protection of diversity is the hallmark of a free and
open society. It is the recognition of the inherent dignity of all human beings. Freedom is an
indispensable ingredient of human dignity' (Ngcobo J, para 49).
[W]e must not assume that the idea of dignity is inextricably linked to a liberal-
individualistic view of human beings whose life-choices deserve respect. If the state takes
a particular view of what is required for people to live dignified lives, it may introduce
regulations to restrict the freedom which people have to make choices which, in the
state's view, interfere with the dignity of the individual, a social group or the human race
as a whole. . . . The quest for human dignity may subvert rather than enhance choice and
in some circumstances may limit rather than extend the scope of traditional `first
generation' human rights and fundamental freedoms.37
This may suggest that dignity is an indeterminate value ± it cannot
guide us as to when constraints should be placed on state interference
with liberties and when it should require positive intervention. The
capabilities approach to human dignity developed by Nussbaum provides
us with at least one set of criteria for requiring positive state intervention.
In Nussbaum's account, the state has a strong duty to guarantee the
social basis of each person's basic human capabilities based on a principle
of each person as an end.38 This fundamental commitment necessarily
implies that the state is entitled to restrict the liberties of some members
of society (provided this does not impinge on their basic human
capabilities) in order to guarantee to everyone the social basis of basic
human capabilities.39 In this sense, a focus on capabilities as social goals
is also closely related to human equality. As Nussbaum explains:
[M]aking capabilities the goal entails promoting for all citizens a greater measure of
material equality than exists in most societies, since we are unlikely to get all citizens
above a minimum threshold of capability for truly human functioning without some
redistributive policies.40
Nussbaum's approach is compatible with a range of different theories
about the degree of material equality that should be guaranteed in a just
society from complete egalitarianism, a Rawlsian difference principle,
and a focus on an ample social minimum for all.41 However, in most
societies in the world, including South Africa, we are very far from
37 Feldman (note 32 above) 685.
38 Women and Human Development (note 4 above) 5-6, 89. In certain core areas of human
functioning, `a necessary condition of justice for a public political arrangement is that it
delivers to citizens a certain basic level of capability' (71). She draws a distinction between
capability and functioning, defending the former as the appropriate political goal given the
value we attach to respecting people's choices. It is not the role of government to push people
into `functioning of the requisite sort' (87). She argues that `for political purposes it is
appropriate that we shoot for capabilities and those alone. Citizens must be left free to
determine their own course after that. The person with plenty of food may always choose to
fast, but there is a great difference between fasting and starving, and it is this difference that I
wish to capture' (87).
39 In discussing socio-economic rights such as the right to shelter in terms of her capabilities
approach, Nussbaum identifies the central focus as `how people are actually enabled to live':
`Analyzing economic and material rights in terms of capabilities thus enables us to set forth
clearly a rationale we have for spending unequal amounts of money on the disadvantaged, or
creating special programs to assist their transition to full capability.' Women and Human
Development (note 4 above) 99.
40 Ibid 86.
41 Ibid.
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providing even the basic minimum required to promote human
capabilities.42
It is also helpful in this context to conceive of human dignity as a
relational value. According to this notion we are interconnected beings.
Our sense of self-worth, personal development and well-being is
inextricably bound up with the extent to which we are valued by others
and by the society at large. O'Regan J expresses this when she writes in
Makwanyane that
the right to life was included in the Constitution not simply to enshrine the right to
existence. It is not life as mere organic matter that the Constitution cherishes, but the
right to human life: the right to live as a human being, to be part of a broader
community, to share in the experience of humanity . . . The right to life is more than
existence, it is a right to be treated as a human being with dignity.43
To value human dignity is not to create zero-sum trade-offs between
negative liberty and welfare, but to constitute positive social relationships
which both respect autonomy and foster the conditions in which it can
flourish.44 Dignity as a relational value can help us to perceive the limits
of individual claims on social resources with reference to the needs and
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42 See, further, ibid 12, 86.
43 Makwanyane (note 9 above) paras 326-7. In Soobramoney (note 14 above), the Court affirmed
that having access to social goods and services were aspects of the right to `. . .human life: the
right to live as a human being, to be part of a broader community to share in the experience of
humanity' (para 31). The associational dimensions of human dignity were also recently
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the decision of Minister of Home
Affairs v Watchenuka 2004 (4) SA 326 (SCA). The Court held that conditions imposed on
refugees and asylum-seekers prohibiting them from undertaking employment and from
studying constituted an infringement of their rights to human dignity and education.
According to Nugent JA for the court: `The freedom to engage in productive work ± even
where that is not required in order to survive ± is indeed an important component of human
dignity . . . for mankind is pre-eminently a social species with an instinct for meaningful
association. Self-esteem and the sense of self-worth ± the fulfilment of what it is to be human ±
is most often bound up with being accepted as socially useful' (para 27). It is important,
however, not to associate the right to work only with productive, waged work. One of the
major factors contributing to gender inequality is society's persistent undervaluing of
reproductive work, of which women bear the disproportionate burden. See in this regard,
President of the Republic of South African v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 38 (Goldstone J).
44 The relational conception of autonomy is described in the following terms by Jennifer
Nedelsky: `Interdependence becomes the central fact of political life, not an issue to be shunted
to the periphery in the basic question of how to ensure individual autonomy in the inevitable
face of collective power. The human interactions to be governed are not seen primarily in
terms of the clashing of rights and interests, but in terms of the way patterns of relationship
can develop and sustain both an enriching collective life and the scope for genuine individual
autonomy . . . The constitutional protection of autonomy is then no longer an effort to carve
out a space into which the collective cannot intrude, but a means of structuring the relations
between individuals and the sources of collective power so that autonomy is fostered rather
than undermined' (note 7 above) 8. In the South African context, the interdependence between
individual and community is captured in the spirit of ubuntu. Mokgoro J explains that while
`ubuntu envelops the key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity,
conformity to basic norms and collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity
and morality. Its spirit emphasises a respect for human dignity, marking a shift from
confrontation to conciliation' Makwanyane (note 9 above) para 308 (Mokgoro J). In Port
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (note 25 above) the Constitutional Court (Sachs J)
equal worth of others and the available resources of the society.45 But the
corollary is a collective acknowledgement that we are diminished as a
society to the extent that any of our members are deprived of the
opportunities to develop their basic capabilities to function as individual
and social beings.46 Mokgoro J expresses this idea in the following
passage in the case of Khosa v Minister of Social Development:
Sharing responsibility for the problems and consequences of poverty equally as a
community represents the extent to which wealthier members of the community view the
minimal well-being of the poor as connected with their personal well-being and the well-
being of the community as a whole. In other words, decisions about the allocation of public
benefits represent the extent towhich poor people are treated as equalmembers of society.47
It is implicit in a relational concept of dignity that claims on social
resources are strongly justified when people lack the basic material
necessities of life to enable them to survive and develop as members of the
community. If we are to constitute ourselves as a society that respects
human dignity (as we have through the founding values of our
Constitution), we are committed to redressing the social and economic
conditions of those whose capacity for development and agency is
stunted by poverty. By failing to do so, we undermine the very
foundations of our new constitutional democracy.48
further noted: `The spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the
population, suffuses the whole constitutional order. It combines individual rights with a
communitarian philosophy. It is a unifying motif of the Bill of Rights, which is nothing if not a
structured, institutionalised and operational declaration in our evolving new society of the
need for human interdependence, respect and concern' (para 37, footnotes omitted).
45 In Soobramoney (note 14 above), the Court justified the limitation of the appellant's right to
tertiary-level health care services by referring to the state's duty to manage its resources so as
to meet the basic needs of others: paras 28, 31 (Chaskalson P), and para 54 (Sachs J). See
however the critique of the Soobramoney reasoning by Karin van Marle ` ``No Last Word'' ±
Reflections on the Imaginary Domain, Dignity and Intrinsic Worth' (2002) Stell LR 299,
305-7.
46 In an article on the application of the value of human dignity in criminal law, Shannon Hoctor
argues that `dignity has a communitarian aspect: by requiring respect for others' claims to
dignity, vindication of the human dignity of all is better assured, and a community of mutual
co-operation and solidarity is fostered.' `Dignity, Criminal Law and the Bill of Rights' (2004)
121 SALJ 265, 315 (footnotes omitted).
47 Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) para 74 (footnotes omitted).
48 In the context of unfair discrimination, the Constitutional Court has held that `the interests of the
community lie in the recognition of the inherent dignity of every human being and the elimination
ofall formsofdiscrimination'Hoffmann vSouthAfricanAirways2001 (1) SA1 (CC)para43. In the
context of evictions ofpoorpeople from their homes, theCourt has stated: `It is not only the dignity
of the poor that is assailedwhen homeless people are driven frompillar to post in a desperate quest
for a place where they and their families can rest their heads. Our society as a whole is demeaned
when state action intensifies rather thanmitigates theirmarginalisation.The integrity of the rights-
based vision of the Constitution is punctured when governmental action augments rather than
reduces denial of the claims of the desperately poor to the basic elements of a decent existence.
Hence the need for special judicial control of a process that is both socially stressful and potentially
conflictual' Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (note 25 above) para 18.
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The decision in the Treatment Action Campaign case49 illustrates the
underlying relational concept of human dignity at work. The government
was being asked to provide a relatively cheap anti-retroviral drug
(Nevirapine)50 with a significant potential of reducing the risk of mother-
to-child transmission of HIV.51 While there were additional costs
associated with prescribing the drug, particularly the costs of HIV-
testing and counselling facilities, the Court found that government had
the resources to extend these facilities to hospitals and clinics throughout
the public health sector beyond the limited number of test sites.52 For the
babies of poor women who give birth in the public health sector, this drug
has significant life-saving potential. For society to deny poor women and
their newborns access to `a simple, cheap and potentially lifesaving
medical intervention'53 would clearly indicate a lack of respect for their
dignity as human beings entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and
concern.
I have sought to illustrate that human dignity derives from the value
we ascribe to human beings. Because we value them, we wish to ensure
that conditions are created that enable them to develop their capabilities
and to flourish as individual and social beings. This encompasses respect
for people's diverse identities, their associational freedoms, as well as
concern for the material conditions that shape their life choices. Dignity
as a value requires respect for people's freedoms, but also helps us to
understand why these liberties must sometimes be constrained to protect
and nurture the capabilities of others. Finally, I have argued that a
relational concept of human dignity best captures the interdependence
between individual and social welfare, and also illuminates the
circumstances in which people have justified claims to social resources.
In the next section I examine how the value of human dignity can be
applied to enrich South Africa's socio-economic rights jurisprudence. I
also examine, through my discussion of the Canadian case of Gosselin,54
applications of human dignity that can operate to exclude the poor from
access to benefits, rather than to facilitate their inclusion.
IV HUMAN DIGNITY AND ITS VALUE IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
JURISPRUDENCE
I have argued for a relational concept of human dignity in which society's
neglect to redress conditions of socio-economic disadvantage represents a
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49 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).
50 The manufacturers of Nevirapine had offered to make it available to the South African
government free of charge for a period of five years, for the purpose of reducing the risk of
mother-to-child transmission of HIV. Ibid para 19, read with paras 71 and 80.
51 Ibid para 57.
52 Ibid paras 118±120
53 Ibid para 73.
54 Gosselin v QueÂbec (note 1 above).
collective failure to value human dignity. This concept helps to challenge
stigmatising notions of the poor as `dependants' of society and as
undeserving of social support.55 Conditions of poverty are not a
reflection of the moral blameworthiness of groups experiencing poverty56
rather they reflect how we as a society have failed to value human dignity.
There is another dimension of human dignity that can make an
important contribution to the development of our socio-economic rights
jurisprudence. This is the concept of the equal worth of people that lies at
the heart of human dignity. As the Constitutional Court has affirmed in
the context of its equality jurisprudence, the acknowledgment of equal
moral worth requires treatment as an equal as opposed to equal
treatment.57 Treatment as an equal requires full acknowledgement of the
racial, gender, social, economic, cultural and other differences between
groups in society. Thus the quest for equal worth or dignity is not a quest
for uniformity, but a quest to eliminate the disadvantages and inferior
status that attach to membership of particular groups.58 This substantive
approach to equality inevitably requires a contextual analysis which is
able to identify the real situations and disadvantages experienced by
various groups in the light of our history as well as current social,
economic, political and gender relations.59
Treatment as an equal demands that we also respond appropriately to
the actual needs of differently situated groups. In Harksen v Lane NO,
O'Regan J (in her dissenting judgment) affirms that respect for human
dignity in equality jurisprudence requires an approach that is responsive
to individual needs and circumstances in order to create a buffer against
the construction of further patterns of discrimination:
55 The Constitutional Court has affirmed the close relationship between human dignity and
social assistance in Khosa (note 47 above) paras 41 and 52 and in Mashavha v President of the
RSA 2004 (12) BCLR 1243 (CC) para 51.
56 On approaches to adjudication in the US premised on notions of the moral blameworthiness
of the poor, and the attitude of `helplessness' in response to their claims, see: T Ross `The
Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness' (1991) 79 Georgetown LJ 1499-1547.
57 See R Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (1977) 227, cited in Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (3)
SA 1012 (CC) para 32.
58 As Sachs J states in National Coalition (note 7 above): `At the heart of the equality
jurisprudence is the rescuing of people from a caste-like status and putting an end to their
being treated as lesser human beings because they belong to a particular group. The indignity
and subordinate status may flow from institutionally imposed exclusion from the mainstream
of society or else from powerlessness within the mainstream . . .' (para 129). He goes on to
affirm that `[e]quality means equal concern and respect across difference' as opposed to
uniformity which `can be the enemy of equality' (para 132).
59 In Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) O'Regan J refers to the `deep patterns of
disadvantage' which have resulted from gender discrimination in our society, particularly in
the case of black women. A `key message of the Constitution' is that `all such discrimination
needs to be eradicated from our society.' (para 44). In its socio-economic rights jurisprudence,
the Constitutional Court has also indicated the reasonableness of the State's measures to
realise socio-economic rights must be evaluated in the light of their `social, economic and
historical context': Grootboom (note 10 above) para 43.
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Such patterns of discrimination can occur where people are treated without the respect
that individual human beings deserve and particularly where treatment is determined not
by the needs or circumstances of particular individuals, but by their attributes and
characteristics, whether biologically or socially determined.60
Building on this concept of human dignity in equality jurisprudence,
dignity as a value in socio-economic rights jurisprudence requires that we
take account of the relative urgency of the needs of different individuals
and groups and respond correspondingly.61 This implies a contextual
analysis with regard to the position of particular groups in society and the
different order and types of needs experienced by these groups. Thus, for
example, one would be required to consider the multifarious ways in
which gender relations contribute to women's unequal access to socio-
economic resources.62 One would also have to consider the nature of the
deprivation and the seriousness of its impact on the affected individuals.
In Watchenuka, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that a considera-
tion of the severe impact of an administrative decision on the socio-
economic circumstances of the applicants was a highly relevant factor.63
Thus, while the state could justifiably limit the rights of non-nationals
(such as asylum-seekers) to undertake employment and education,
different considerations applied when the applicants were destitute.
When employment `is the only reasonable means for the person's
support' what is then in issue `is not merely a restriction upon the
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60 Harksen v Lane NO (note 9 above) para 92 (emphasis added). In Canadian equality
jurisprudence, human dignity is also central to the determination of discrimination in terms of
s 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In Law v Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration) (1999) 170 DLR (4th) 1 the Supreme Court developed the
following understanding of what respect for human dignity in equality jurisprudence requires:
`Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth. It is
concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment. Human dignity is
harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances which do not
relate to individual needs, capacities or merits. It is enhanced by laws which are sensitive to the
needs, capacities, and merits of different individuals, taking into account the context underlying
their differences. Human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are marginalized,
ignored, or devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognise the full place of all individuals and
groups within Canadian society'' (para 53) (emphasis added). In her dissenting judgment in
Gosselin (note 1 above) L'Heureux-DubeÂ J states: `Prejudicial effects giving rise to a s. 15 claim
may result when a legislature simply fails to turn its mind to the particular needs and abilities
of individuals or groups so as to provide equal benefit under the law to all members of society'
(para 120).
61 See the discussion by Bilchitz of the concept of urgency in protecting people's basic interest in
survival and non-impaired functioning: D Bilchitz `Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth: The
Minimum Core and its Importance' (2002) 118 SALJ 484, 490-1.
62 Martha Nussbaum argues for the importance of `an approach that is respectful of each
person's struggle for flourishing, that treats each person as an end and as a source of agency
and worth in her own right' Women and Human Development (note 4 above) 69. She critiques
utilitarian and resource-based approaches to human development as `insensitive to contextual
variation, to the way circumstances shape preferences and the ability of individuals to convert
resources into meaningful human activity' (69-70). Particularly in the developing world we
need to be `highly alert' to individual variations of need and the extent to which differently
situated individuals can `convert resources into valuable functionings' (68).
63 Watchenuka (note 43 above).
person's capacity for self-fulfilment, but a restriction upon his or her
ability to live without positive humiliation of degradation'.64 To prohibit
work and study in these circumstances would normally be unlawful. This
requires the Refugee Reception Offices and the Standing Committee on
Refugee Affairs to consider carefully the impact on the individual
applicant and his or her family of a restrictive condition in relation to
work or study.
In its socio-economic rights jurisprudence the Constitutional Court has
affirmed that a reasonable government policy must cater for different
groups and orders of need in society.65 The Court has also taken the
critical step of affirming that a government programme that neglects to
attend to urgent needs cannot be reasonable. In Grootboom the
government's otherwise comprehensive and rational housing pro-
gramme66 was faulted for failing to cater for groups in urgent need:
To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account the degree and extent of the
denial of the right they endeavour to realise. Those whose needs are most urgent and
whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by the
measures aimed at achieving the realisation of the right. It may not be sufficient to meet
the test of reasonableness to show that the measures are capable of achieving a statistical
advance in the realisation of the right. Furthermore, the Constitution requires that
everyone must be treated with care and concern. If the measures, though statistically
successful, fail to respond to the needs of those most desperate, they may pass the test. 67
64 Ibid para 32. In relation to freedom of education, Nugent JA held that when `a child is lawfully
in this country to seek asylum (there might be other circumstances as well) I can see no
justification for limiting that right so as to deprive him or her of the opportunity for human
fulfilment at a critical period . . . A general prohibition that does not allow for study to be
permitted in appropriate circumstances is in my view unlawful' (para 36, footnotes omitted,
emphasis added).
65 Thus in Grootboom (note 10 above), the Court held that a reasonable programme `must be
balanced and flexible and make appropriate provision for attention to housing crises and to
short, medium and long-term needs. A programme that excludes a significant segment of
society cannot be said to be reasonable' (para 43).
66 Ibid paras 53-54.
67 Ibid para 44 (emphasis added). See also para 52: `[T]here is no express provision [in the
Housing Act 107 of 1997] to facilitate access to temporary relief for people who have no access
to land, no roof over their heads, for people who are living in intolerable conditions and for
people who are in crisis because of natural disasters such as floods and fire, or because their
homes are under threat of demolition. These are people in desperate need.' See also TAC (note
49 above): `The provision of a single dose of Nevirapine to mother and child for the purpose of
protecting the child against the transmission of HIV is, as far as the children are concerned,
essential. Their needs are ``most urgent'' and their inability to have access to Nevirapine
profoundly affects their ability to enjoy all rights to which they are entitled. Their rights are
``most in peril'' as a result of the policy that has been adopted and most affected by a rigid and
inflexible policy that excludes them from having access to Nevirapine' (para 78). In Port
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (note 25 above), the Constitutional Court
emphasised the importance of taking account of `the actual situation' of the persons concerned
in eviction proceedings: `In a society founded on human dignity, equality and freedom it
cannot be presupposed that the greatest good for the many can be achieved at the cost of
intolerable hardship for the few, particularly if by a reasonable application of judicial and
administrative statecraft such human distress could be avoided' (para 29).
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The Court has further acknowledged that `the poor are particularly
vulnerable and their needs require special attention'.68 Respect for human
dignity requires society to marshal its resources and respond strongly to
situations in which certain groups are unable to gain access to basic
socio-economic needs. The consequences of the deprivation will be severe
(either in terms of threats to life or health) and erode the foundations for
the further development of people's capabilities. To value human beings
as a society demands an appropriate response. The overall resources and
capacity of the society concerned will naturally determine this response.
But dignity demands that society does its utmost to ensure that those
groups who are unable to gain access to basic socio-economic needs are
assisted.69
This duty is recognised by the United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in interpreting States parties'
obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (1966). According to the Committee `. . . a State party in
which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential
foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing,
or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to
discharge its obligations under the Covenant.' 70 This places a burden on
the state, should it seek to attribute its failure to meet its core obligation
to a lack of available resources, to `demonstrate that every effort has been
made to use all resources that are at its disposal in an effort to satisfy, as a
matter of priority, those minimum obligations'.71
In Grootboom and TAC, the Constitutional Court declined the
invitation of the amici to base its decision on the concept of a minimum
core obligation. In doing so the Court articulated a range of concerns
relating to the concept. These included the assumed inflexibility of the
minimum core, difficulties in setting minimum standards in the context of
varying needs and opportunities for accessing the rights, the lack of
institutional competence for determining minimum standards, and the
impossibility of giving everyone immediate access to even a `core'
THE VALUE OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN INTERPRETING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 17
68 Grootboom (note 10 above) para 36; TAC (note 49 above) para 70.
69 In Khosa (note 47 above), the Court (Mokgoro J) stated: `The right of access to social security,
including social assistance, for those unable to support themselves and their dependants is
entrenched because as a society we value human beings and want to ensure that people are
afforded their basic needs. A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are
accessible to all if it is to be a society in which human dignity, freedom and equality are
foundational' (para 52, emphasis added, footnotes omitted). Nussbaum argues: `Programs
aimed at raising general or average well-being do not improve the situation of the least well-
off, unless they go to work directly to improve the quality of those people's lives. If we
combine this observation with the thought . . . that each person is valuable and worthy of
respect as an end, we must conclude that we should look not just to the total or the average,
but to the functioning of each and every person. We may call this the principle of each person as
end'. Women and Human Development (note 4 above) 56.
70 General Comment 3 (Fifth session, 1990) The Nature of States Parties Obligations (art 2(1) of
the Covenant) UN doc. E/1991/23 para 10.
71 Ibid.
service.72 However, properly conceived, the minimum core obligation is
neither an absolute duty nor a rigid standard. Rather, it establishes a high
threshold of justification when a deprivation of `essential' levels of socio-
economic goods and services is at issue. The state is required to show that
it has exhausted all available methods, and that its resources are
`demonstrably inadequate'73 to meeting those needs. This raises the
central importance of justification in ensuring the strong protection of
socio-economic rights. This issue will be revisited in Part V below.
Thus far I have argued that the value of human dignity can enrich our
socio-economic rights jurisprudence, first, by justifying claims against
social resources when groups lack the material conditions necessary for
the development of their capabilities as human beings. Second, respect
and concern for the dignity of each person requires an approach that
considers the impact of the deprivation on the actual needs and
circumstances of the individuals and groups concerned. Finally, it
requires an appropriate response to these conditions. Urgent needs and
severe deprivations demand a strong, immediate response. We give
expression to the value of human dignity in our constitutional
jurisprudence by placing the state under a stringent burden of
justification in claims involving a deprivation of basic needs.
However, the use of human dignity in socio-economic rights
jurisprudence is not without its pitfalls. As critics have cautioned in
relation to South Africa's equality jurisprudence,74 there is a danger that
human dignity in our socio-economic jurisprudence will result in a focus
on subjective personality issues such as the claimants' feelings of self
worth and self-respect. This focus can divert attention away from the real
issue of the impact of the deprivation on claimants.
The Canadian Supreme Court decision in Gosselin illustrates how
differing conceptions of human dignity can influence the outcome of a
social benefits claim.75 A class action was brought challenging social
security regulations in QueÂ bec which set the base amount of welfare
benefits for adults between the ages of eighteen and thirty years at about
one-third of the base amount payable to those thirty years and over. The
difference was between $170 per month for the younger group and $466
per month for the older. The latter was deemed by the legislature to
constitute `the bare minimum for the sustainment of life'.76 The only way
that those under 30 years could raise their benefits was to participate in
various educational and employability programmes. However, for the
72 Grootboom (note 10 above) paras 29-33; TAC (note 49 above) paras 26-39.
73 General Comment 3 (note 70 above) para 11.
74 See Part II above and the works cited there.
75 Gosselin (note 1 above).
76 Ibid paras 251, 285 (Bastarche J) and para 334 (Arbour J).
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majority of young welfare recipients like the appellant participation in
these programmes was fraught with difficulties, including restrictive
eligibility requirements and the limited number of places available.77 The
Supreme Court of Canada had to consider whether the challenged
regulation violated section 15 (equality right) of the Charter on the
grounds that it discriminated on the basis of age. Violations of s 7 of the
Charter78 and s 45 of the QueÂ bec Charter of Rights and Freedoms79 were
also alleged.
The majority of the Supreme Court found no violations of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or the QueÂ bec Charter. In
regard to s 15, the majority held that a reasonable person in the
claimant's circumstances would have perceived the government's positive
motives in creating an incentive-based welfare scheme for young people.
According to the government this scheme was designed to promote the
greater long-term employability of young people. Thus, making welfare
payments conditional in this manner did not violate the dignity or human
worth of persons under 30 years of age.80 This can be contrasted with the
more impacts-based approach to human dignity in the dissenting
judgment of L'Heureux-DubeÂ J. After dealing with the practical effects
of the regulation on the claimant's ability to meet basic subsistence
needs,81 she considered whether the claimant would perceive that her
dignity had been threatened:
She would have been told that the long-term goal of the legislative scheme was to affirm
her dignity. The reasonable claimant would also likely have been a member of the 88.8
per cent who were eligible for the programs and whose income did not rise to the levels
available to all adults 30 years of age and over . . . The reasonable claimant would have
made daily life choices in the face of an imminent and severe threat of poverty. The
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77 Thus the government of QueÂ bec had only made 30 000 programme places available even
though 85 000 single people under 30 years of age were on social assistance. See Gosselin (ibid)
para 283. Four of the dissenting judgments on s 15 raised serious issues about the accessibility
of these programmes and questioned whether the regulation was really designed to enhance
the long-term situation of those under 30 years as opposed to simply saving money. See, for
example, the discussion by Bastarche J in paras 276 ± 283 and Arbour J in para 393.
78 Section 7 of the Canadian Charter provides that: `Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice.'
79 Section 45 of the QueÂ bec Charter provides that every person in need has a right to `measures of
financial assistance and to social measures provided for by law, susceptible of ensuring such
person an acceptable standard of living.'
80 Gosselin (note 1 above) paras 52 ± 53, 65 (McLachlin CJC). In Law (note 60 above), the
Supreme Court of Canada had held that the key issue in determining whether a distinction
conflicts with s 15(1) is whether `a reasonable person in circumstances similar to those of the
claimant would find that the legislation which imposes differential treatment has the effect of
demeaning his or her dignity' having regard to the individual's or group's traits, history, and
circumstances' (para 60, cited in Gosselin para 25).
81 She found that the regulation in question exposed Ms Gosselin to the risk of severe poverty
and in so doing breached her psychological and physical integrity. For example, she pointed
out that in 1987 the monthly cost of proper nourishment was $152, whereas the guaranteed
monthly welfare payment to young adults was $170. Gosselin (note 1 above) para 130.
reasonable claimant would likely have suffered malnourishment. She might have turned
to prostitution and crime to make ends meet. The reasonable claimant would have
perceived that as a result of her deep poverty she had been excluded from full
participation in Canadian society. She would have perceived that her right to dignity was
infringed as a sole consequence of being under 30 years of age, a factor over which, at any
given moment, she had no control.82
In L'Heureux-DubeÂ J's judgment, the legislature's good motives did not
outweigh the severe impact of the regulation on the claimant's physical
and psychological integrity and her human dignity as a member of
Canadian society. Her approach to the question whether there was a
correspondence between the ground of distinction and the actual needs
and circumstances of the affected group is also significant. In this regard,
she held that `there should be a strong presumption that a legislative
scheme which causes individuals to suffer severe threats to their physical
and psychological integrity as a result of their possessing a characteristic
which cannot be changed does not adequately take into account the
needs, capacity or circumstances of the individual or group in question'.83
The approach of the majority in Gosselin to the assessment of whether
human dignity had been infringed by the relevant regulation illustrates
the dangers of a narrow, `personality interests'-type approach to human
dignity in assessing the constitutionality of a group's exclusion from
social benefits. This is further complicated by the introduction of an
objective element, focusing not on the actual experiences of the applicant,
but on conjecture as to what a reasonable person in the applicant's
position would feel. As Sandy Fredman argues, `[t]he reasonable person
turns out to be no more than the government's own perception of its
policy aims, thus underscoring the deference of the standard of review'.84
The majority in Gosselin is too deferential to legislative choices that result
in a vulnerable group suffering severe deprivation ostensibly to promote
the longer-term objectives of greater self-sufficiency and employability
among youth on welfare. The minority judgments, by contrast, emphasise
the impact on young welfare beneficiaries of the exclusion from a
minimally adequate standard of benefits. The infringement of human
dignity arises from the fact that the exclusion seriously undermines the
physical and psychological integrity of young welfare beneficiaries. This
placed a burden on the state to justify the exclusion based on compelling
evidence and arguments. The minority concludes that the consequences
82 Ibid paras 131 ± 132.
83 Ibid para 135 (emphasis added).
84 S Fredman `Providing Equality: Substantive Equality and the Positive Duty to Provide' paper
delivered at the SAJHR Conference, 5-7 July 2004, 11 (forthcoming in (2005) 21 SAJHR part
2). See also G Brodsky `Gosselin v QueÂbec (Attorney General): Autonomy with a Vengeance'
(2003) 15 Canadian J of Women & the Law 194.
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were of such a severe nature that they could not be justified by the state's
long-term objectives.85
The minority's approach to human dignity in Gosselin holds the most
potential for positively influencing our socio-economic rights jurispru-
dence. The final section of this paper examines how the value of human
dignity can influence our socio-economic rights jurisprudence to make it
more responsive to claims for the provision of basic human needs.
V STRENGTHENING OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO BASIC NEEDS
CLAIMS
In many respects the evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights
gives effect to the value of human dignity developed thus far. The
Constitutional Court endorses positive state measures to achieve access
to socio-economic rights, a context-sensitive evaluation of reasonable-
ness, and the requirement that a reasonable government programme
includes short-term relief for those who are in urgent need and are living
in intolerable conditions. This applies even if the overall programme is
statistically successful in the long term in advancing people's access to
socio-economic rights.86
The Court's model of review for positive socio-economic rights
claims87 centres on the reasonableness inquiry. The fundamental question
to be answered by the Court in such cases is whether the measures
adopted by the state (or the failure to adopt appropriate measures) are
reasonable in the circumstances. The reasonableness inquiry is further
conditioned by the qualifying phrases in the second subsections of
sections 26 and 27, namely the availability of resources and the latitude of
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85 Thus, for example, Arbour J held as follows in considering the s 1 limitation inquiry (having
found that the regulation breaches the s 7 rights to life and security of the person): `it is
difficult to accept that denial of the basic means of subsistence is rationally connected to values
of promoting the long-term liberty and inherent dignity of young adults. Indeed, the long-term
importance of continuing education and integration into the workforce is undermined where
those at whom such ``help'' is directed cannot meet their basic short-term subsistence
requirements. Without the ability to secure the immediate needs of the present, the future is
little more than a far-off possibility, remote both in perception and in reality.' Gosselin (note 1
above) para 392. This also has resonance with the rationale in Grootboom (note 10 above).
Here the government's rational housing programme that was geared to the long-term goal of
providing housing for all was nonetheless constitutionally defective for its failure to attend to
short-term, urgent housing needs (see notes 64±66 above and accompanying text).
86 Grootboom (note 10 above) paras 44, 68 and see the Court's order para 99.
87 These claims involve two main situations. The first is the exclusion of a particular group from
an existing social programme, the second entails the absence of a suitable programme
providing access to particular benefits. In the first type of situation, as the Khosa case (note 47
above) illustrates, socio-economic rights and equality claims may often overlap. In the second
situation, litigants may rely on the socio-economic rights provisions in the Bill of Rights to
argue that the state is under a duty to adopt an appropriate programme `capable of facilitating
the realisation of the right' in question. See Grootboom (note 10 above) para 41. The absence of
a programme catering for the provision of basic needs may also engage the right to equality,
particularly in the context of a substantive interpretation of equality. See Brodsky (note 84
above).
`progressive realisation' afforded the state.88 The Court is clearly
reluctant to dictate particular policy choices to government. Instead it
contemplates in Grootboom that `a wide range of possible measures'
would meet the requirements of reasonableness and thus comply with
ss 26 and 27.89 It is certainly appropriate that the Court respects the
primary role of the democratically elected legislature in relation to socio-
economic policy. The executive also has particular institutional
competency to design and implement appropriate policies and pro-
grammes. Reasonableness review provides the courts with a flexible,
context-sensitive tool for adjudicating positive socio-economic rights
claims.90
However, its application in relation to claims involving a deprivation
of the basic necessities of life is inadequate. The stakes are high for the
individuals and groups who approach the courts for relief, entailing
threats to life, health and the ability to function in society. I have sought
to develop the argument that a failure by society to respond in proportion
to the seriousness of the deprivations faced by its members represents a
failure to value their fundamental dignity as human beings. In this section
I will argue why I believe that the judicial protection of these claims is
insufficient, and how it could be improved. Stronger judicial potential of
these claims will also signal to the state the constitutional importance of a
robust response to situations of severe material deprivation.
One of the shortcomings of the current structure of reasonableness
review is that individual litigants bear an onerous burden of proof and
persuasion to demonstrate the unreasonableness of government pro-
grammes. The Constitutional Court has made it clear that ss 26 and 27
confer no direct entitlement to claim immediate delivery of goods and
services from the state, only a right to require government to adopt a
reasonable programme.91 Thus it is not enough for a group of litigants to
approach the Court alleging that they are poor and seriously
malnourished, thereby establishing a prima facie violation of the right
to food in s 27 of the Constitution. Instead litigants will have to show
that the state's actions or omissions are unreasonable in terms of the
88 Grootboom (note 10 above) paras 38, 41, 45-6. Although `progressive realisation' affords the
State the latitude of not requiring immediate realisation of the right, the Court also affirms
that it imposes specific obligations on the State to make demonstrable progress in facilitating
access to the rights, and in avoiding retrogressive measures: see Grootboom para 45.
89 Ibid para 41.
90 The following key features of a reasonable government programme to realise socio-economic
rights were developed by the Court in the Grootboom and the TAC cases: the programme must
be comprehensive, coherent, coordinated; it must be balanced and flexible, making
appropriate provision for short, medium and long-term needs, and not exclude a significant
segment of society; it must include reasonable provision for those in urgent need; it must be
reasonably conceived and implemented; it must be transparent, and its contents must be made
known effectively to the public.
See Grootboom (note 10 above) paras 39-43; TAC (note 49 above) para 123.
91 Grootboom (ibid) paras 41, 95; TAC (ibid) paras 32-39, and 125.
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second subsection of s 27. To do so, they will have to review a wide range
of government social programmes, and assess their reasonableness in the
context of the state's capacity and available resources.92 Establishing the
unreasonableness of a disparate set of government programmes in the
light of the state's available resources will be a matter of great factual and
legal complexity which will often be beyond the capacity of indigent and
vulnerable groups.93 It thus does not facilitate the practical justiciability
of this class of claims.94
In cases (such as the one discussed above) where people will face
irreparable harm through not having their basic needs met, a more
appropriate response would be to give the applicants the benefit of a
presumption of unreasonableness. The effect would be that prima facie
unreasonableness is established when a disadvantaged group shows that
it lacks access to the social goods and services that are required to sustain
life, health and a basic level of functioning. The burden is then on the
state to rebut this presumption with compelling reasons. This presump-
tion would not be dissimilar to that operating in the context of the
equality clause, where discrimination on a listed ground is presumptively
unfair.95 A clear presumption in favour of this category of socio-
economic rights claimants recognises that a social failure to value human
dignity is at stake when individuals and groups experience deprivations of
subsistence needs. These groups are denied the opportunity to survive
and to develop their capabilities. Respect and concern for the value and
intrinsic worth of the individuals so afflicted should trigger a presump-
tion of unreasonableness and place a burden of justification on the state.
It should be evident that this approach does not require the setting of
inflexible minimum standards of delivery for each socio-economic right.
92 The Court indicated that it would take into account the `interconnectedness' of rights' in
assessing whether the state has fulfilled its obligations: Grootboom (ibid) para 24. Among the
measures that the Court indicated would be relevant in relation to access to housing were steps
to make the rural areas of the country more viable so as to limit the migration of people from
rural to urban areas in search of jobs (para 34). It also indicated that social assistance
programmes put in place under s 27 `would be relevant to the state's obligations in respect of
other socio-economic rights.' (para 36).
93 See in this regard the submissions of the amici curiae in TAC (the Community Law Centre and
IDASA) available at <http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/ser/docs_2002/
TAC_MTCT_Case_Heads_of_Arguments.doc> para 31.1.
94 The impact of the Court's rejection of the concept of a minimum core obligation on the
practical justiciability of socio-economic rights was developed by Wim Trengove SC in
representing the amici curiae in the TAC case. On behalf of the amici it was argued that
practical justiciability is of particular importance in the enforcement of socio-economic rights
because the purpose of these rights is to protect the interests of the poor who lack access to
basic amenities of life: `For most of them, the right of access to court is already a paper right
and not a practical reality. The very socio-economic rights designed for their protection and
advancement must accordingly not be interpreted in a way that makes enforcement practically
impossible' (para 30.2).
95 Section 9(5).
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As the Constitutional Court observed in Grootboom, such an approach
would be insensitive to the varying needs and circumstances of differently
situated groups in society.96 It also does not impose an absolute standard
of performance on the state regardless of the social and economic
context. However, it does require placing a strong burden of justification
on the state in relation to the absence of basic levels of provision for
groups living in poverty.97
However, given the nature of the deprivations at stake and the
seriousness of the consequences for the affected groups, this is not an easy
burden to discharge. A rigorous standard of scrutiny is required. In terms
of the relational concept of human dignity I have sought to develop,
dignity fails to be protected when the standard of justification demanded
of government in respect of a failure to fulfil basic needs is low. A
response that is not proportionate to the nature of the deprivation and its
impact communicates a message that the affected group is not worthy of
equal respect and concern.98 I suggest two elements of a stricter review
standard for this category of claims.
A stricter standard of scrutiny would require a compelling government
purpose for failure to ensure that vulnerable groups have access to basic
96 See note 72 above and accompanying text. As Nussbaum argues, `individuals vary greatly in
their needs for resources and in their abilities to convert resources into valuable functionings'.
(Women and Human Development, note 4 above, 68). She gives the examples of a pregnant or
lactating woman who needs more nutrients than a non-pregnant woman; a child who needs
more protein than an adult and a person with paralysed limbs who needs many more resources
to achieve the same level of mobility as a person without this disability. See further the
discussion at 68-70.
97 See the similar presumption suggested by L'Heureux-DubeÂ J in Gosselin (note 1 above).
98 In Khosa (note 47 above), the Court held that `when the rights to life, dignity and equality are
implicated in cases involving socio-economic rights, they have to be taken into account along
with the availability of human and financial resources in determining whether the state has
complied with the constitutional standard of reasonableness' (para 44). Although not explicitly
stated, this suggests a tightening of the review standard in a socio-economic rights case when
life, dignity and equality are at stake. In Jaftha (note 12 above), the Constitutional Court held
that the relevant provisions of the Magistrates' Court Act 32 of 1944 (permitting sales of
execution against people's homes for debt without judicial oversight) rendered people
vulnerable to homelessness as they would no longer qualify for housing subsidies. Without
such assistance `they may be rendered homeless and never able to restore the conditions for
human dignity' (para 39). The Court accordingly held, in the limitations analysis (s 36), that
this constituted `a severe limitation of an important right' (para 39). The European Court of
Human Rights recently held in Connors v United Kingdom Application 66746/01 (judgment of
27 May 2004) that the eviction of a gypsy family from a council-owned site constituted a
serious interference with their right to respect for their `private and family life' and their home
in terms of art 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (1950). The Court observed
that art 8 `concerns rights of central importance to the individual's identity, self-determination,
physical and moral integrity, maintenance of relationships with others and a settled and secure
place in the community' (para 82). The consequence of the eviction was homelessness for the
family `with the adverse consequences on security and well-being which that entails' (para 85).
These serious consequences warranted, in the Court's opinion, `particularly weighty reasons of
public interest by way of justification'. In these circumstances, `the margin of appreciation to
be afforded to the national authorities must be regarded as correspondingly narrowed' (para
86).
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needs. Competing state priorities and resources-based justifications often
give the courts the most difficulty as they raise issues of separation of
powers and institutional competence.99 However, respect for the dignity
of human beings requires a serious engagement with these justifications.
It is not sufficient to simply assert, as the Court did in TAC, that, `[i]t is
impossible to give everyone access even to a ``core'' service immedi-
ately'.100 The state should at least be required to establish the factual
underpinnings of its justifications based on resources.101 There are
different formulations of the threshold to be met concerning resource-
based justifications for limiting access to constitutional rights. For
example, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
requires states to show that their resources for meeting basic needs are
`demonstrably inadequate' in the context of other equally important
government purposes.102 In Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney
General),103 the Canadian Supreme Court held that s 15(1) (equality)
imposed positive duties on the government to ensure `reasonable
accommodation' of disadvantaged groups in government programmes
to the point of `undue hardship'.104
Whatever formulation is adopted, courts should scrutinise the state's
evidence and arguments closely with a view to assessing whether they
constitute a compelling justification in the context of current South
African society for failing to provide basic needs. The state is not
necessarily required to show the diversion of all resources to the provision
of basic needs. Ideally basic needs claims should be addressed in the
context of integrated social programmes as opposed to ad hoc, crisis
99 See, for example, TAC (note 49 above): `It should be borne in mind that in dealing with such
matters the courts are not institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging factual and
political enquiries necessary for determining what the minimum-core standards . . . should be,
nor for deciding how public revenues should most effectively be spent' (para 37).
100 Ibid para 35.
101 In the context of the positive duties imposed by civil and political rights such as the right to vote,
the courts have required that the factual basis for justifications based on logistics and costs be
established by the state in the context of a limitations enquiry: Minister of Home Affairs
v National Institute for Crime Prevention (NICRO) 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) paras 47-51.
102 See notes 70 and 71 above and the accompanying text.
103 (1997) 151 DLR (4th) 577 (SC). The Court was faced with a challenge to the failure of the
Medical Services Commission of British Columbia to provide sign language interpretation
for deaf patients in the health system. It held that this omission constituted a prima facie
violation of their right to equal benefit of the law without discrimination under s 15(1) of the
Charter.
104 Ibid paras 77-80. In response to the government's argument in the s 1 (limitations) analysis
that the appellants' claim would have `a ripple effect throughout the health care field, forcing
governments to spend precious health care dollars accommodating the needs of a myriad of
disadvantaged persons' (para 91), the Court held as follows: `The respondents have presented
no evidence that this type of accommodation, if extended to other government services, will
unduly strain the fiscal resources of the state. To deny the appellants' claim on such
conjectural grounds, in my view, would denude s 15(1) of its egalitarian promise and render
the disabled's goal of a barrier-free society distressingly remote' (para 92).
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interventions.105 Sometimes, however, temporary solutions may be
essential to respond to individual needs until the groups can be catered
for within mainstream programmes. What should be required is evidence
that the state is taking concrete and well-targeted budgetary and other
measures to address effectively the situation of those who are
experiencing severe deprivations of basic needs. Despite the above
statement in the TAC case, the Court, in fact, carefully analysed the
state's resource-based justifications for the failure to extend the provision
of Nevirapine throughout the public health sector and concluded that
they were unconvincing.106 The Court's decision in Khosa also illustrates
that it is both willing and able to engage vigorously with the state's
resource-based justifications for failing to fulfil socio-economic rights.107
The second element of a strengthened review standard concerns the
inclusion of a more rigorous proportionality analysis.108 The Court
comes close to a proportionality test by establishing, as an important
factor in the reasonableness enquiry, whether the state has made
provision for those in immediate need. As Danie Brand argues, the
Court `leans significantly closer [to a proportionality test] by incorporat-
ing such an element into its standard of scrutiny, narrowing the range of
policy options that it would be legitimate for government to choose from
and thinking about the relative efficiency of different policy options.'109
In TAC, the Constitutional Court required government to adopt a
particular policy, namely the provision of Nevirapine (or any other
equally appropriate or better method) throughout the public health
sector for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV. This
was unavoidable given the fact that there was in fact very little scope for a
range of policy choices. Without the provision of Nevirapine (or a similar
anti-retroviral drug), large numbers of infants would continue to be
infected with HIV and die prematurely as a result of mother-to-child
transmission. Where the state does have a legitimate range of policy
choices to respond to basic needs claims it would be appropriate for the
Court to give the legislature and executive the first opportunity to design
an appropriate programme. However, this could be achieved at the
105 As the Constitutional Court observed in Grootboom (note 10 above), a reasonable
programme `must be balanced and flexible and make appropriate provision for attention
to housing crises and to short, medium and long term needs' (para 43).
106 See notes 49-53 above and accompanying text.
107 Khosa (note 47 above) paras 60-62 (the inclusion of permanent residents in the social grants
system `will be only a small proportion of the total cost').
108 Theunis Roux observes that although the reasonableness test `undoubtedly requires the court
to substitute its view of what the constitution requires ± the inclusion of the excluded group ±
for that of the political branches', it `stops short . . . of a full-blown proportionality test'. T
Roux `Legitimating Transformation: Political Resource Allocation in the South African
Constitutional Court' (2003) 10 Democratization 92, 97.
109 D Brand `The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, or
``What are Socio-Economic Rights For?'' in Botha et al (eds) (note 15 above) 33, 41.
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remedial stage and should not preclude a finding that government has
failed to fulfil its positive duties.110
The inclusion of a more explicit proportionality analysis should include
a requirement that government show that there are no less restrictive
means of achieving its purposes than a total denial of access to basic
socio-economic goods and services.111 This should also entail showing
that it has taken steps to mitigate the harm suffered as a result of the
deprivation. Mitigating measures are particularly important when the
provision of even basic levels of services to all who need them is
unattainable in the short term. The situation of these groups must remain
a matter of high priority and programmes aimed at alleviating the worst
impact of the deprivations experienced must be put in place.112 In
addition, the state must show that it is monitoring the deprivation of
basic needs, and devising programmes and strategies for remedying the
situation within the shortest possible period of time.113
In many respects, this inquiry resembles the limitations inquiry under
s 36. This is a consequence of the model of reasonableness review
adopted by the Court for measuring compliance with the state's positive
obligations under ss 26 and 27. In the Khosa case, the Court alluded to
the `difficulty in applying section 36 of the Constitution to the socio-
110 This could be facilitated through the use of the remedy of supervisory jurisdiction, which is
discussed further below.
111 Currie and De Waal describe this element of the proportionality analysis as follows: `The
limitation will not be proportionate if other means could be employed to achieve the same
ends that will either not restrict rights at all, or will not restrict them to the same extent.
I Currie and J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) 183-4. In Eldridge (note 103
above), the Canadian Supreme Court held, in its s 1 (limitations) enquiry, that the
government had `manifestly failed to demonstrate that it has a reasonable basis for
concluding that a total denial of medical interpretation services for the deaf constituted a
minimum impairment of their rights'. (para 87). The Ministry of Health had decided not to
fund the interpretation programme even in part. In this regard, the Court held: `Other
options such as the partial or interim funding of the program offered by the Western Institute
for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, or the institution of a scheme requiring users to pay either
a portion of the cost of interpreters or the full amount if they could afford to do so, were
either not considered or were considered and rejected' (para 93).
112 In General Comment No 3 (note 70 above), the UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights emphasised that `even where the available resources are demonstrably
inadequate, the obligation remains for a State party to strive to ensure the widest possible
enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances' (para 11). It goes on to
highlight the continuing obligation to protect the poor even during periods of resource
scarcity: `Similarly, the Committee underlines the fact that even in times of severe resource
constraints whether caused by a process of adjustment, of economic recession, or by other
factors the vulnerable members of society can and indeed must be protected by the adoption
of relatively low-cost targeted programmes' (para 12).
113 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has adopted the view that the
State's duties `to monitor the extent of realization, or more especially of the non-realization,
of economic, social and cultural rights and to devise strategies and programmes for their
promotion, are not in any way eliminated as a result of resource constraints'. General
Comment 3 (note 70 above) para 11.
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economic rights entrenched in sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution'.114
The Court held that it was not necessary to decide the issue of whether `a
different threshold of reasonableness' is called for in ss 26 and 27 than is
the case in section 36.115 An advantage of conducting the inquiry into the
justifiability of the state's acts or omissions in terms of the general
limitations clause (s 36) is the requirement of a law of general application.
This has the important benefit that limitations on people's access to basic
needs would have to be publicly debated and adopted by the elected
representatives of the people.116 However, if the internal limitations in
sections 26(2) and 27(2) are going to do the major work in assessing the
state's compliance with its positive duties, the inquiry should encompass
a high standard of justification, including a more rigorous proportion-
ality analysis, at least in respect of basic needs claims.
The standard of scrutiny may vary in intensity, depending on the
nature of the interests at stake. A strict level of judicial scrutiny is
appropriate when a case concerns the claimants' inability to gain access
to the resources needed to survive and participate in society.117 This strict
form of scrutiny should not be triggered only in emergency or crisis
situations. The Court in Grootboom also referred in its order to those
`living in intolerable conditions'.118 This clearly contemplates a broader
set of circumstances than emergencies. In insisting on the strong judicial
protection of basic survival needs, we should not lose sight of the fact
that we are concerned not only with physical survival, but with the
essential material conditions that each person needs to develop his or her
capabilities and to function effectively as a member of society. This
includes the physical, psychological and social dimensions of an
individual's personhood.119 The standard of review can be progressively
relaxed when claims are made to levels of social provisioning that are less
closely related to people's ability to survive and function effectively in
114 Khosa (note 47 above) para 83. See also the academic commentaries cited by the Court in
note 88 of the judgment.
115 Ibid para 84. For a recent view on the relationship between the internal limitations in ss 26
and 26 and the general limitations clause in s 36, see K Iles `Limiting Socio-Economic Rights:
Beyond the Internal Limitations Clauses' (2004) 20 SAJHR 448.
116 It is noteworthy that in respect of the negative violation of the duty not to deprive people of
existing access to socio-economic rights the Constitutional Court has now held in Jaftha
(note 12 above) that justification is appropriately considered in terms of the general
limitations clause. See paras 31 to 34.
117 David Bilchitz refers to people's basic or `urgent' interest `in being free from threats to one's
survival, being free from severe physical suffering, and not being exposed to serious health
risks that impair one's ability to act'. `Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth: The Minimum
Core and its Importance' (2002) 118 SALJ 484, 490. He argues that the urgency of the
interests at stake justify strong judicial protection (491).
118 Grootboom (note 10 above) para 99.
119 See the discussion of Nussbaum's list of `central human capabilities' in notes 26 to 29 above
and accompanying text. Bilchitz (note 117 above) 490 also refers to people's more extensive
interest `in living in an environment that is conducive to their flourishing and development on
physical, emotional and mental levels'.
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society. This graduated standard of review is accommodated by the
concept of `progressive realisation' in ss 26(2) and 27(2).120 Thus, while a
stronger standard of review is justified for basic needs claims, it may be
appropriate to allow the state greater latitude (in terms of both time and
resource allocation priorities) when the claim involves more tertiary levels
of provisioning. In the case of children, material deprivation can have a
profound impact on the future development of their basic capabilities,
calling for heightened scrutiny of the impact of such deprivations.121
The final area in which the Court could strengthen its constitutional
response to socio-economic rights claims is in the field of remedial
jurisprudence. A detailed discussion of this aspect is beyond the scope of
the present paper. However, it is evident that the nature of the urgent
interests at stake in the socio-economic rights claims that are the focus of
this paper demands an appropriate and effective remedy. The orders
handed down in cases such as TAC will ultimately result in the extension
of critical benefits to significant numbers of people.122 However, the
Court has indicated that a finding that a government programme is
unreasonable will not necessarily imply that all in desperate need should
receive relief immediately.123 Nonetheless, as the Court indicated in TAC,
`[e]very effort must, however, be made to do so as soon as reasonably
possible'.124 There will be situations where it would be impossible to
remedy immediately a situation that has been found to be in violation of
ss 26 and 27, or where the granting of relief only to the litigants before
the court would be inequitable to other similarly situated groups. The
courts' broad power to make `any order that is just and equitable'125
provides the remedial flexibility to make appropriate orders in these
situations. However, one should never lose sight of the fact that there are
serious interests of human survival and dignity at stake. The language of
the orders handed down by the courts should reflect this fact, and signal
120 See the discussion of the Court's interpretation of `progressive realisation' in Liebenberg
(note 13 above) ch 33, 41-42.
121 The drafting of s 28(1)(c) of the Constitution suggests a stronger standard of scrutiny for
children's socio-economic rights. Prima facie, children are guaranteed a basic level of socio-
economic rights, with limitations to this entitlement falling to be determined in terms of the
general limitations clause (s 36). For a critical evaluation of the Court's approach to the
interpretation of children's socio-economic rights, see Liebenberg (note 12 above) ch 33, 48-
52.
122 This, of course, assumes that the state diligently executes the Court's orders and that there is
effective monitoring and advocacy in respect of the implementation of the orders by
institutions such as the SA Human Rights Commission, the press and non-governmental
organisations. On the efforts of the Treatment Action Campaign in seeking to ensure the
implementation of the TAC order, see M Heywood `Contempt or Compliance: The TAC
Case After the Constitutional Court Judgment' (2003) 4 ESR Review 7.
123 Grootboom (note 10 above) para 69; TAC (note 49 above) para 125.
124 TAC (note 49 above) para 125.
125 Section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution.
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the requirement that the state remedy the defect `diligently and without
delay'.126 This is exemplified in the mandatory nature of the order
handed down in TAC combined with the duty to take the steps specified
in the order `without delay'.127 When it is not inappropriate or unjust, the
courts should also seriously consider granting individual remedies to the
successful litigants.128 This reflects the value we should place on the
dignity of each person.
The TAC order has been criticised for its failure to grant the supervisory
order sought by the applicants.129While the Constitutional Court accepted
that such orders could be given in appropriate circumstances, it indicated
that that they should generally not be made in those terms `unless this is
necessary' to secure compliancewith a court order.130 TheCourtwent on to
express its faith that the government would respect and execute its orders.
However, an equally important consideration, as Geoff Budlender has
suggested, `is the risk of severe consequences (such as the loss of life)' in the
event of a failure by the government to comply with its obligations.131 In
cases where severe economic deprivation threatens people's lives and
capacity for future development, this fact shouldweigh heavily with a court
in considering a supervisory order. This is particularly the case where the
breach cannot be remedied by a single action132 but requires a series of
structural reforms and administrative actions taken over a period of
time.133 Finally, if there is a range of policy options for responding to basic
needs claims (as in the Grootboom situation), the remedy of supervisory
jurisdiction can be formulated to allow the state to select the appropriate
policy while retaining judicial supervision in respect of the constitutionality
of the policy choice and its implementation. In this way, a supervisory
remedy may be crafted that respects the roles and competencies of the
legislature and executive without abdicating judicial responsibility for the
enforcement of socio-economic rights.134
126 See s 237 of the Constitution.
127 TAC (note 49 above) para 135. The Grootboom order has been criticised for its purely
declaratory nature and the impact this had on the slow implementation of the order: see K
Pillay `Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the Enforcement of Socio-Economic
Rights' (2002) 6 Law, Democracy & Development, 255.
128 As the Court pointed out in August (note 9 above) para 30: `We cannot deny strong actual
claims timeously asserted by determinate people because of the possible existence of
hypothetical claims that might conceivably have been brought by indeterminate groups.'
129 See D Bilchitz `Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the
Foundations for Future Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence' (2003) 19 SAJHR 1, 23-26.
The High Courts in both the Grootboom and TAC cases handed down supervisory orders:
Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C) 293H-294C; Treatment Action
Campaign v Minister of Health 2002 (4) BCLR 356 (T) 386I-384H.
130 TAC (note 49 above) para 129.
131 G Budlender `Access to Courts' (2004) 121 SALJ, 358.
132 For example, the `reading in' remedy granted in the Khosa case (note 47 above) to cure the
omission of permanent residents from the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 (para 98).
133 See: W Trengove `Judicial Remedies for Violations of Socio-Economic Rights' (1999) 1, 9-10.
134 See, for example, City of Cape Town v Rudolph 2004 (5) SA 39 (C).
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VI CONCLUSION
At the core of the value of human dignity lies the injunction to respect the
intrinsic worth of all human beings. Drawing on Nussbaum's work, I
have argued that we value human beings by viewing them in the context
of the reality of their lives and inquiring what they are actually able to be
and to do. Through this inquiry we are confronted with the importance of
social power relations and material conditions for people's ability to
survive and develop their capabilities as individual and social beings.
To constitute ourselves as a society that values human dignity we must
develop appropriate responses to conditions of disadvantage and
material deprivation in social policy and constitutional adjudication. In
constitutional adjudication this requires a focus on the actual impact of
the state's actions or omissions on the life chances of disadvantaged
groups. It also demands a proportionately urgent response to conditions
that undermine people's ability to survive and develop their capabilities.
This is promoted by placing a strong burden of justification on the state
in claims where a deprivation of access to basic human needs is at stake.
This approach does not advocate a two-tier standard of review based on
a rigid distinction between `core' and `non-core' needs. If minimum core
obligations are conceived as universal, abstract and a-contextual
standards of state provision, they will certainly be unjust to a range of
groups who do not fit the background norms and conditions that inform
the setting of these standards. Instead, what is envisaged is a continuum
of judicial scrutiny of the state's justifications informed by a contextual,
evolving assessment of the position of the claimant group in society, the
nature of the resource or service to which access is sought, and the impact
of the denial of such access on the affected group.
In many respects the Constitutional Court's evolving jurisprudence on
socio-economic rights promotes the contextual, relational concept of
human dignity developed in this paper. However, our constitutional
response to claims of material deprivation could be strengthened, and I
have suggested how this could be accomplished within the Court's model
of reasonableness review and remedial jurisprudence.
A society characterised by stark inequalities and deep poverty is most
in peril of failing to value the human dignity of the poor. The role of the
Constitutional Court is to hold us accountable to the vision we
articulated when we adopted our Constitution so as to, as the Preamble
declares, `[i]mprove the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential
of each person'.
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